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Abstract –The nodes of a regular two-dimensional lattice play a game based on the joint action
of two distinct levels. At the first step of the game, using a random prescription half players are
assigned the cooperation and half the defection state. At the bottom level the strategy choice
is done on the mere basis of imitation according to the homo imitans principle, generating a
form of collective intelligence that makes the system sensitive to the criteria determining the
strategy choice adopted at the top level. The units of the top level, in fact, play the prisoner’s
dilemma game and are allowed to update their strategy either by selecting the strategy of the
most successful nearest neighbor, success model, or merely on the basis of the criterion of the best
financial benefit, selfishness model. The intelligence emerging from imitation-induced criticality
leads in the former case to the extinction of defection and in the latter case to the extinction of
cooperation. The former case is interpreted as a form of network reciprocity enhanced by the
imitation-induced criticality and contributing to the evolution towards cooperation. We perturb
the selfishness model with a form of morality pressure, exerted by a psychological reward λ for
cooperation, to establish the sensitivity of collective intelligence to morality. We find that when
λ gets a crucial value λc, exceeding the temptation to cheat, the system makes a transition from
the supercritical defection state to the critical regime, with the warning that an excess of morality
and religion pressure may annihilate the criticality-induced resilience of the system.
Introduction. – The unification of behavioral sci-
ences is an attractive and challenging enterprise that
would be impossible without using game theory [1]. The
recent book by Gintis [1] aims at the unification of Behav-
ioral Sciences, namely, at the ambitious purpose of unify-
ing biology, psychology, economics, anthropology and po-
litical science, stressing however that game theory alone
is not enough to realize this important goal. Game the-
ory is a theoretical attempt at explaining why the selfish
action of single individuals is compatible with the emer-
gence of altruism and cooperation. Nowak and May [4]
have attracted the attention of an increasing number of
researchers on the network reciprocity, a special condition
where spatial structure favors the emergence of altruism,
see also [2], in spite of its nodes playing the prisoner’s
dilemma game [3], which is expected to favor defection.
Actually, since the patch owner, either a cooperator C or
a defector D is replaced by the neighbor with the largest
payoff [4], this is equivalent to updating the strategy of
each player adopting that of the most successful neighbor,
and a cluster of cooperators has the effect of protecting the
units of the cluster from the exploitation of the defectors.
As illustrated in the recent review paper of Wang et al
[5], the research work in this field is now focusing on the
topology of networks and especially on the emerging field
of multilayers networks to explain the pattern formation
with production of clusters protecting cooperators from
the exploitation of the defectors so as to favor their sur-
vival of cooperators. This Letter adopts a multilayers per-
spective, by using however dynamical rather than merely
topological arguments, in such a way as to be as close as
possible to the project of unification of behavioral sciences
recently proposed by Grigolini et al [6, 7], as an attempt
at addressing the challenge of Gintis [1]. Furthermore the
multiple layers do not necessarily correspond to different
nodes, but in this Letter refer to different levels of human
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behavior, the social, the financial and the spiritual. The
bottom layer of this Letter is based on the observation
that the individuals of a network playing the prisoner’s
dilemma game are the units of a human society and are ex-
pected to be strongly influenced by imitation [8–10]. The
individuals of this network make a choice between the co-
operation state C and the defection state D, without any
form of cognition. This choice is not determined by the
wish of maximizing the personal benefit through imitation
of the most successful neighbor [2] or by the greedy choice
of an immediate payoff, but imitation is as blind as the
bird tendency to select their flying direction on the ba-
sis of the flying directions of the neighbor birds [11], with
no consideration of the personal benefit, either direct or
indirect. The imitation strength is a control parameter
hereby denoted by the symbol K1. A critical value of K1,
called K1c, exists making it possible for the swarm to fly
as a whole. Although the action of the single individuals
of the network does not require any form of cognition, as
stressed by the authors of Ref. [12, 13], criticality gener-
ates a form of collective intelligence. This collective intel-
ligence is characterized not only by the criticality-induced
long-range correlation but also, and especially, by tempo-
ral complexity [14–17], a condition making the complex
network flexible and resilient. It is important to stress
that the supercritical condition is characterized by fluctu-
ations around a non vanishing mean field as random as
the fluctuations around the vanishing mean field of the
subcritical regime, thereby lacking the flexibility and re-
silience of criticality.
At the top layer the units play the prisoner’s dilemma
game [3] and exert an influence on the bottom level choos-
ing their strategy according to either the success or self-
ishness criterion.
The success model is realized as follows. For most of
time steps the choice of strategy is determined by the bot-
tom level, and from time to time the units are allowed to
select their strategy adopting that of their most success-
ful nearest neighbor, as suggested by the pioneer work of
Ref. [4]. The success model yields the impressive effect
of annihilating the emergence of the branch with the ma-
jority of defectors when the system adopting this choice
is made intelligent by imitation-induced criticality. We
are convinced that this effect affords a solid explanation
of the evolution towards cooperation, this being a very
important result of this Letter.
We compare the success model to the selfishness model,
where the player does not adopt the strategy of the most
successful nearest neighbor, but she makes her choice only
on the basis of her personal benefit. She evaluates the
financial benefit derived from the defection choice and
the financial benefit that she would get from the coop-
eration choice, giving larger weight to the maximal profit.
The benefit of a given choice is done assuming that the
unit in action can play with equal probability with all
her neighbors. The selection of the convenient strategy is
weighted with a second control parameter K2, with the ra-
tio ρK = K2/K1 establishing if the link with the top layer
is stronger, ρK > 1, or weaker, ρK < 1, than the link
with the bottom layer. Switching on the interaction with
the top layer has the effect of leading to the extinction of
cooperation with a big loss for society, even if, as we shall
see hereby, K1 > 0 yields imitation-induced clusters of co-
operators with financial benefit for society, this being the
reason why the success model, for K  K1c leads to the
extinction of defectors. The strategy choice determined
by the criterion of maximal personal benefit, rather than
by the choice of the strategy of the most successful near-
est neighbor [4], on the contrary, yields the extinction of
cooperation, with an even very small value of ρK , as an
effect of imitation-induced intelligence.
To complete the illustration of the role of criticality-
induced intelligence we study the influence of morality
on the dynamics of the selfishness model showing that
as an effect of imitation-induced intelligence the system
becomes so sensitive to morality as to make a psycho-
logical reward moderately exceeding the temptation to
cheat, robust enough as to prevent the collapse of the so-
cial system into the sub-criticality disorder. In principle
the influence of morality on the system should be estab-
lished by the interaction of the network with an additional
layer. For simplicity’s sake, we modify the conventional
prisoner’s dilemma game [1, 18] through the introduction
of the psychological reward for the choice of cooperation.
The strength of psychological, called λ, affords a simpli-
fied way to describe the influence that an additional layer,
concerning morality and religion, may have on the selfish-
ness model. We find that, when the bottom layer operates
at criticality, a crucial value λc exists with the effect of
preventing the extinction of cooperators and of recovering
the criticality-induced temporal complexity that is essen-
tial for the healthy behavior of the social system. We call
this Asbiyyah effect [19], this arabic world meaning group
feeling, namely the natural tendency of human beings to
cooperate. This natural disposition is enhanced by religion
and it has the eventual effect of increasing the social pros-
perity, but, in accordance with the observation of Ahmed
[20], we find that λ > λc, the super-asbiyyan condition,
may be as bad as the lack of social cohesion.
Game theory. – As well known [3], game theory rests
on the crucial inequality
T > R > P > S, (1)
where R denotes the reward that a cooperator gets when
playing with another cooperator. The parameter T > R
is the payoff of a defector: it is larger than R thereby
t = T − R is a measure of the temptation to cheat. S
is the payoff of a cooperator playing with a defector, and
P < R is the payoff of a defector playing with another
defector. The condition
2R > T + S (2)
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social benefit of cooperation
indicates that the community gets a larger benefit from
the play between two cooperators than from the play be-
tween a cooperator and a defector. Of course, also the
play between two defectors with 2R > 2P is less beneficial
to the community than the play between two cooperators.
We adopt the choice made by Gintis [1, 18] and we set
R = 1, P = 0, T = 1 + t and S = −s. To study the in-
fluence of morality on the selfishness model we introduce
the psychological reward λ, setting
R = 1 + λ, (3)
T = 1 + t, (4)
P = −λ (5)
and
S = −s. (6)
In this Letter we adopt always but in Fig. 4 the choice
s = 3 (7)
and
t = 2. (8)
Note that we denote by N the total number of play-
ers. They are the nodes of a two-dimensional regular net-
work of size 32. Therefore throughout the whole Letter we
adopt N = 32X32. We use the symbol L to denote the
number of time steps, ranging from L = 104 to L = 106.
Decision-Making, Success, Selfishness and Influ-
ence of Morality Model . – To establish an inter-
action between the bottom and the top level we adopt a
natural extension of the Decision Making Model (DMM)
of Ref. [8]. The transition rate from the cooperator to the
defector state, g12, is given by
g12 = g0exp
[
−K1
(
M1 −M2
M
)
−K2
(
ΠC −ΠD
|ΠC |+ |ΠD|
)]
(9)
and the transition rate from the defector to the cooperator
state, g21, is given by
g21 = g0exp
[
K1
(
M1 −M2
M
)
+K2
(
ΠC −ΠD
|ΠC |+ |ΠD|
)]
.
(10)
The meaning of this prescription is as follows. The pa-
rameter 1/g0 defines the time scale and we set g0 = 0.1
throughout. We consider N units. Each unit has M neigh-
bors (four in the case of the regular two-dimensional lattice
used in this Letter). The cooperation state corresponds to
the state |1 > and the defector state to the state |2 >. In
the case K2 = 0, this is the ordinary DMM of Ref. [8]. If
the unit is in the cooperator state, |1 >, and the majority
of its neighbors are in the same state, then the transi-
tion rate becomes smaller and the units sojourns in the
cooperation state for a longer time. If the majority of its
neighbors is in the defector state, then the unit that has
to make a decision sojourns in the cooperator state for a
Fig. 1: Mean field of the bottom level when K2 = 0. We make
10 realizations.
shorter time. Analog prescription is used if the unit is in
the defector state. Note that at K = K1c the units move
from a dynamical condition where they are virtually in-
dependent the ones from the others to a condition where
global order emerges. In the case of two-dimensional reg-
ular lattice of this article, K1c ≈ 1.65.
Fig. 1 illustrates the second-order phase transition gen-
erated by the DMM, namely, the model of this Letter when
K2 = 0. This corresponds to the condition where no bias
exists for the choice of either cooperation or defection. In
the initial condition the N units of the network are ran-
domly assigned to either the cooperation or the defection
state with the same probability, making zero the mean
field of the network
〈ξ〉 ≡
∑N
i ξi
N
, (11)
where either ξ=1 or ξ = −1, according to whether the
i− th unit is in the cooperation or in the defection state.
Of course, due to the fact that, as earlier stated, we are
using a finite number of units, N = 1024, the mean field
fluctuates around the vanishing mean value. As we in-
crease K1 the intensity of fluctuations tends to increase.
This is a finite-size effect discussed in detail in the ap-
plications of the DMM model [14, 15]. In the case where
each node is coupled to all the other nodes, the DMM
yields analytical results for the mean field that can be
interpreted as the space coordinate of a particle in a non-
linear over-damped potential under the action of a random
fluctuation generated by the finite size effect. At critical-
ity, the potential is quartic, exerts a weaker containment
on diffusion and makes larger the width of its equilibrium
distribution. The mean field fluctuation around the ori-
gin has an inverse power law with index µ = 1.5: a form
of temporal complexity ensuring the maximal efficiency in
the transport of information from one network to another
with the same complexity [16]. This important effect has
been proved also in the case of a neural network model
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[17], thereby suggesting that criticality-induced temporal
complexity may be a condition of great importance for
the sensitivity of a complex system to its environment.
Temporal complexity must not be confused with critical
slowing down [15]. Both properties are manifestations of
criticality and both properties are characterized by the
emergence of an inverse power law, which makes the sur-
vival probability not integrable. However, critical slowing
down is a property of the thermodynamic limit, implying
that the number of units N is virtually infinite, whereas
temporal criticality is a finite size effect [21]. Temporal
complexity, in the ideal case where the inverse power law
is not truncated has to be thought of as a form of perennial
out of equilibrium condition, which should force physicists
to extend the linear response theories to the non-ergodic
condition [7].
Note that the cooperator and the defector payoffs are
determined by the states of the nearest neighbors. Thus,
we have
ΠC = (1 + λ)
MC
M
− sMD
M
(12)
and
ΠD = (1 + t)
MC
M
− λMD
M
, (13)
where MC is the numbers of neighbors in the cooperative
state and MD is the number of neighbors in the defector
state. We remind the readers that in this Letter M = 4.
It is important to state that we evaluate also the financial
benefit for the community by making an average over all
possible pairs of interacting units, according to the pre-
scription:
Bij = 2, (14)
if both units of the pair (i, j) are cooperators,
Bi,j = 1 + t− s, (15)
if one unit of the pair (i, j) is a cooperator and the other
is a defector,
Bi,j = 0, (16)
if both units of the pair (i, j) are defectors.
Notice that the choice between the cooperation and de-
fection state is done with λ ≥ 0, while the financial bene-
fits for the society are evaluated, as shown by Eqs. (14),
(15) and (16), by setting λ = 0. This is so because λ,
the psychological reward, is an incentive to cooperate that
does not directly increase the social payoff, even if it has
the eventual effect of increasing the society wealth by stim-
ulating cooperation. In conclusion, the societal benefit Π
is given by
Π =
∑
(i,j)
Bij , (17)
denoting the sum over all possible pairs (i, j).
To define the selfishness model we set λ = 0 and we
establish the interaction between the bottom and the top
level by assigning a positive value to the coupling coeffi-
cient K2. In this case, a cooperator is encouraged to adopt
Fig. 2: Social benefit as a function of K1 when K2 = 0. We
make ten realizations. We notice that the social benefit in-
creases upon increase of K1 in the whole subcritical region.
the cooperator state for a longer time if the financial ben-
efit associated the choice of the cooperator condition, ΠC ,
is larger than the financial benefit ΠD, corresponding to
selecting the defector state. The success model is estab-
lished by setting both λ = 0 and K2 = 0. The influence
of the top on the bottom level is established by randomly
selecting a fraction r of the total number L to allow each
unit to adopt the strategy of the most successful nearest
neighbor. We note that small values of r play the same
role as small values of ρK in the selfishness model. The
influence of morality on the selfishness model is studied
by setting λ > 0, while keeping λ = 0 for the evaluation
of the social benefit, as earlier stated.
Criticality-induced network reciprocity. – In
Fig. 2 we show the social benefit as a function of K1 when
K2 = 0, namely, the strategy choice is only determined by
imitation. The social benefit in the supercritical regime
is obviously maximal when all the units select the coop-
eration strategy and it vanishes when all the units select
defection. Much more interesting is the social benefit for
K < K1c. We see that there is an increase of social benefit
with increasing K1. This is a consequence of the fact that
imitation generates clusters of cooperators and clusters of
defectors and the increasing social benefit is due to the
increasing size of the clusters of cooperators.
The results of Fig. 3 support our claim. In fact, we see
that the social benefit increases in a way that is qualita-
tively very similar to the increase of the number of units
that have four neighbors in the same state, either coopera-
tion or defection state. A cluster of units belonging to the
same state increases as a function of K1 with a prescrip-
tion qualitatively similar to the increase of the number of
units with four neighbors in the same state.
We now adopt the success model, namely, we perturb
the imitation-induced strategy choice making the units
pay some attention to the success of their nearest neigh-
p-4
social benefit of cooperation
Fig. 3: The lines of the triangles represents the social benefit.
The line of black squares denotes the number of units with four
neighbors in the same state.
bors. We run the model for L time steps, and we randomly
select 1% of them to update their strategy adopting the
one of their most successful nearest neighbor. As earlier
stated, we use a two-dimensional regular network, where
each unit has 4 neighbors. The results illustrated by Fig.
4 are impressive. The adoption of the strategy of the most
successful nearest neighbor has a very modest effect in the
subcritical region. At criticality, on the contrary, the ef-
fects of this choice become macroscopic and the imitation-
induced phase transition, when the two branches, one with
a majority of cooperator and one with a majority of de-
fectors, are generated with equal probability, the success
model selects the branch with a majority of cooperators.
At very large values of K1 this leads to the extinction of
defectors. On the basis of the results done by our group
on the DMM dynamics we make the very plausible conjec-
ture that this effect is independent of the topology of the
adopted network. In fact, moving from one topology to
another has only the effect of reducing the intensity of the
effort necessary to get consensus, the condition K1 = 1
representing the ideal topology requiring the weakest ef-
fort to get consensus [8].
Morality stimulus on the selfishness model at
criticality. – As earlier mentioned the parameter λ is
only a psychological benefit implying no direct financial
benefit for society. We interpret λ as the strength of the
influence that the morality network has on the selfishness
model.
Here we find the imitation-induced intelligence has a
twofold effect. The collective intelligence is proved to lead
to the abrupt extinction of cooperators, if λ = 0, and to
the abrupt extinction of defectors when λ = λc. With the
values of the parameters adopted in this Letter, λc = 2.5.
Fig. 5, illustrating the effect of a strategy choice when
λ = 0, shows that in the sub-critical regime a very large
value of ρK is required for the extinction of cooperation.
Fig. 4: The mean field of the imitation model as a function of
K1 randomly selecting 0.1% of L steps to update the strategy
of each unit by adopting the strategy of the most successful
nearest neighbor.
As we approach criticality, namely as the system becomes
more and more intelligent, an even very weak interest for
the personal financial benefit leads to the extinction of
cooperators, which, in fact, is shown to occur for ρK ≈
0.06 when K1 = 1.6.
The swarm intelligence of the system makes the model
very sensitive to the influence of morality, as it is clearly
shown by Fig. 6. We see, in fact, that as consequence of
the imitation-induced criticality, the average social bene-
fit undergoes a kind of first-order transition at λc = 2.5,
with a jump from the lack of benefit to a very large value,
when K1 = 1.65 and ρK ≈ 0.12. This indicates that the
criticality-induced intelligence wisely turns the psycholog-
ical reward for the choice of cooperation into a significant
social benefit.
However, a value of λ too large may have the same bad
effects as a value of λ too small. The corresponding cumu-
lative probability is illustrated by Fig. 7, which shows that
the distribution density of the time distances between two
consecutive renewal events is an inverse power law with
the power index µ = 1.5 when λ = λc = 2.5 and it is an
exponential function for both λ < λc and λ > λc. This
is a clear sign that the collective intelligence generated by
criticality [14–17] is lost if the moral incentive to altruism
λ is either weak or excessive.
Concluding Remarks. – In conclusion we have
proved that imitation-induced criticality has the effect of
enhancing the phenomenon of network reciprocity. The
adoption of the strategy of the most successful nearest
neighbor not only protects the cooperator from extinc-
tion, as in the pioneer work of Nowak and May [4], but, at
criticality, it annihilates the branch with the majority of
defectors. If we adopt the selfishness model for the choice
of strategy, the imitation-induced criticality has the effect
of favoring the extinction of cooperators. Under the in-
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Fig. 5: The mean field of the selfishness model as a function
of K2 for different values of K1. We make ten realizations.
Fig. 6: The personal benefit of the selfishness model as a
function of λ. We make an average on ten realizations.
Fig. 7: The cumulative probability of the time distances be-
tween two consecutive regressions to the origin.
fluence of morality stimulus, however, imitation-induced
criticality has the opposite effect of leading to the extinc-
tion of defectors. However, the temporal complexity of
the system is lost for both λ < λc and λ > λc, indicating,
in accordance with Ahmed [20], that a condition of super-
asabiyya is detrimental for human society as the lack of
asabiyya.
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